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“Careful what you wish . . .
Careful what you say . . .
Careful what you wish, you may regret it!
Careful what you wish, you just might get it!”
1
—Metallica, King Nothing (1996)
† Travis J. Denneson graduated from the University of Minnesota with a
B.A. in philosophy in 1999, receiving Phi Kappa Phi honors. He earned his J.D.
from William Mitchell College of Law in June 2003.
A version of this article in an essay format won first prize in the 2003
Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition at William Mitchell College of Law. The
author would like to thank Professor Niels Schaumann of William Mitchell College
of Law for his many helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts.
1. METALLICA, King Nothing, on LOAD (Elektra Records 1996). After
disgruntling many of their fans by playing a substantial role in the legal crusade to
shut down Napster, Metallica found themselves embroiled in a public relations
catastrophe. The band has since taken more congenial measures to discourage
illegal online file sharing and recover lost fan appreciation, including setting up a
web site where fans can download live concert tracks of the band for free. The
“catch,” however, is that the web site can be accessed only by using a special code
number obtained with the purchase their latest album, ST. ANGER (2003). See Kirk
Miller, Free Metallica: Metal Giants Give Away Tracks Online—But There’s a Catch,
ROLLING STONE, July 10, 2003, at 16.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Ownership of Speech
Where artists and entertainers are concerned, it is difficult to
imagine a set of legal protections more important than those
2
provided by both copyright and the First Amendment. Without
3
the exclusive rights granted by copyright laws, authors might have
a difficult if not impossible time earning a living from their
4
creations.
Without the free speech guarantee of the First
Amendment, the specter of state-sanctioned censorship could loom
over authors endeavoring to challenge artistic or societal norms.
The fear of poverty, punishment, or both might well be enough to
keep most of our creative minds quietly confined to their day jobs.
At first blush, the protections offered by copyright and the
First Amendment seem perfectly complementary. The Copyright
5
6
Act works to provide a particular set of pecuniary incentives while
2. Other substantive areas of law often encountered by artists, entertainers,
and their attorneys include contracts, trademark, labor, tax, business
organizations, bankruptcy, family law, immigration, and criminal law. See WILLIAM
D. HENSLEE, ENTERTAINMENT LAW CAREERS, 1-9 (2d ed. 1998).
3. The term “author” in this article does not refer simply to a writer of a
book, but rather to a creator of a work rendered in any medium. Generally, an
author is “[o]ne who produces, by his own intellectual labor applied to the
materials of his composition, an arrangement or compilation new in itself. A
beginner or mover of anything; hence efficient cause of a thing; creator;
originator; a composer, as distinguished from an editor, translator, or compiler.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 133 (6th ed. 1990). See infra notes 71-74 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the different media in which works may
enjoy copyright protection.
4. Some, however, would find this idea debatable.
At least one
commentator has suggested that our current body of federal copyright and patent
statutes might be unnecessary:
[W]e should regard even extant copyright and patent protections
skeptically. Perhaps creators would do just as well without such legal
fripperies. We appear to suffer no shortage of creative perfumes,
recipes, clothes designs, furniture, car bodies, or uninhabited
architectural structures, even though U.S. law affords no effective
protection to them qua original expressions or novel inventions.
Perhaps the same would hold true of subject matter now covered by
copyrights or patents were their protections removed.
Tom W. Bell, INDELICATE IMBALANCING IN COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW, IN COPY
FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 9 (Adam
Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews Jr. eds., 2002) (internal citations omitted). For
purposes of this article, however, the efficacy of copyright’s incentive function in
encouraging original works is assumed.
5. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810, 1101 (2000).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 69-78.
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the First Amendment serves to remove the possibility of certain
7
punitive disincentives. As such, both encourage the advancement
of art and human discourse. However, closer scrutiny reveals that
there is an inherent tension between copyright interests and First
Amendment values. In order to protect an author’s work from
financial exploitation by others, copyright must necessarily make
8
that author’s speech off limits to all but the copyright holder. The
First Amendment expressly states that “Congress shall make no
9
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” but federal copyright
laws make it illegal in many circumstances to use the expression of
10
others in one’s own speech. On a fundamental level, therefore,
copyright entails congressional action specifically designed to
abridge freedom of speech. The resulting quandary is that we are
11
free to express ourselves however we wish, as long as we are
careful not to make use of someone else’s copyrighted expression
12
in the process.
If resolving this basic inconsistency were simply a matter of
pitting a constitutional amendment against a congressional act, the
First Amendment very likely would limit the scope of our current
copyright regime. However, copyright, like the First Amendment,
is firmly anchored in the United States Constitution. Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 expressly grants Congress the power “[t]o

7. See infra text accompanying notes 49-57.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 71-78 for a discussion of the exclusive
rights and remedies copyright grants to authors.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment also applies to state action
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218
(1966).
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000).
11. With certain narrow exceptions. See infra text accompanying note 34.
12. Theoretically speaking, two authors can independently create identical
works without access to each other’s and both can be copyrighted. To be
copyrightable, a work need only be “original” in the sense that it originates from
the author and possesses more than a de minimus amount of creativity. There is no
“novelty” requirement as in patent law. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (explaining that, however unlikely, two poets
can independently create identical poems and both are copyrightable because
each poem originates solely from its respective author). In practice, however,
where proof of access to the work is absent, “striking similarity” will be sufficient to
allow the infringement question to go to the jury. See Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812
F.2d 421, 423 (9th Cir. 1987). Moreover, copyright infringement requires no
showing of intent, and can even be done subconsciously. See ABKCO Music Inc. v.
Harrisongs Music Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that George
Harrison, in writing “My Sweet Lord,” subconsciously copied The Chiffons’s “He’s
so Fine” and was thus liable for copyright infringement).
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promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times
13
to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings . . . .”
Often referred to as the “Copyright Clause,” this constitutional
provision gives Congress the authority to enact a broad range of
federal statutes designed to protect authors’ financial interests in
14
their creations.
The 1976 Copyright Act, which comprises our
current body of federal copyright laws, is the product of this
15
exercise of congressional power.
Because the First Amendment and copyright law are both
securely rooted in the U.S. Constitution, courts have had to find a
means of creating a proper equilibrium between them. In the
16
landmark case of Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
the Supreme Court set out the metes and bounds of copyright and
First Amendment territory. In doing so, the Court employed a
seemingly elegant specimen of doctrinal parsing called the
17
“definitional balance.”
Specifically, the Court held that
“copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy ‘strike[s] a definitional
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by
permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an
18
author’s expression.’ ” The Court also incorporated fair use into
the equation, stating in sum that “First Amendment protections
[are] already embodied in the Copyright Act’s distinction between
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and
the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by
19
fair use . . . .”
The Court also added historical support for its
holding, noting that “it should not be forgotten that the Framers
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression,
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way
to advance public welfare . . . .”).
15. See, e.g., infra Part IV.A (incorporating the fair use defense in the 1976
Copyright Act).
16. 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding that the Nation magazine had no rights
under either the First Amendment or fair use to lift quotations from President
Ford’s as yet unpublished memoirs).
17. Id. at 556.
18. Id. (quoting the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983)).
19. Id. at 560.
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20

disseminate ideas.” The conclusion to be drawn from the Harper
& Row decision, therefore, is that copyright, by definition,
adequately incorporates—and even facilitates—the objectives of
the First Amendment.
This proposition has spurred volumes of commentary, and a
number of scholars have questioned whether the Court’s
definitional balance scheme truly leaves adequate room for the full
21
range of legitimate First Amendment concerns.
With the
ascension of the Internet and novel digital media formats, the
tension between content owners’ rights and the public’s free
speech rights has continued to escalate, and content owners have,
22
as of late, been gaining an upper hand. Now, more than ever, this
issue demands more careful scrutiny than the federal courts have
23
traditionally afforded it.
Recently, the Supreme Court revisited the definitional balance
24
doctrine in Eldred v. Ashcroft. In this case, the Court was presented
with an opportunity to provide a more rigorous analysis of the areas
of tension between copyright and the First Amendment. The
20.
21.

Id. at 558.
See, e.g., RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A
TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT, § 12 (1994); Stephen Fraser, The Conflict
Between the First Amendment and Copyright Law and Its Impact on the Internet, 16
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 21 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright
Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 42 (2001); Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on
Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 709 (1992); Michael A.
Einhorn, Miss Scarlett’s License Done Gone!: Parody, Satire, and Markets, 20 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 589, 603 (2002); Niels B. Schaumann, An Artist’s Privilege, 15
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 249, 252 (1997); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment
Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept
and Feel,” 38 EMORY L. J. 393, 411 (1989).
22. See infra note 79.
23. In essence, the courts have been applying 1970s thoughts to twenty-first
century problems. The definitional balance scheme is gleaned from early
scholarly explorations of the issue during its infancy. See Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-59 (1985) (citing such early
works as Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1615
(1982); Lionel S. Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 78 (1971); Janice E. Oakes, Comment, Copyright
and the First Amendment:Where Lies the Public Interest?, 59 TUL. L. REV. 135 (1984)).
The ball appears to have started rolling with a well-known law review article written
by Melville Nimmer in 1970 and another written by Paul Goldstein. See Melville B.
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First
Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970).
24. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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25

Court instead chose, in terse fashion, to punt the issue away.
Nevertheless, the Court did, in fact, make one important
clarification—a holding that has become the primary impetus for
this article.
B. The Eldred v. Ashcroft Decision

The Eldred case traces its beginnings to 1998, when Congress
26
passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA).
This legislation added another twenty years to the duration of all
27
copyright terms originally set out in the 1976 Copyright Act. The
term extension applied not only to copyrighted works created
subsequent to the CTEA’s effective date, but also to copyrighted
28
works already in existence. The result was that the CTEA tacked
an extra twenty years of bonus copyright protection onto works that
were about to lapse into the public domain.
Somewhat upset by this, a group of individuals and businesses
with plans to utilize works whose copyrights were about to expire
brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, seeking a declaration that the CTEA was
29
unconstitutional. One of the plaintiffs’ principal claims was that
the CTEA violated the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee by
robbing the public of the right to freely use speech that, but for the
30
CTEA, would lapse into the public domain. However, the district

25. The Court’s treatment of the petitioners’ First Amendment claim takes
up a mere page and a half in the Supreme Court reporter. See 123 S.Ct. 769, 78890 (2003).
26. Pub. L. No. 105-298, Title I, §102(b), (d), 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (1976)).
27. Id.
28. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2000).
29. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999). The principal plaintiff,
Eric Eldred, runs a Web site called the “Eldritch Press,” where he publishes the
works of a number of classic literary authors. Access to the works is free to the
public. See http://www.eldritchpress.org (last visited March 13, 2004).
30. See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 75-81, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F.
Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 1:99CV00065 JLG), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/cyber/complaint_amd2.
html (last visited March 13, 2004). The petitioners also challenged the CTEA
under the Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” provision. See id. ¶¶ 56-67. The
Copyright Clause issue is an entirely different can of worms, and hence far outside
the scope of this article. For some interesting materials and discussion regarding
the Eldred decision as a whole on the World Wide Web, see generally
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/ (last visited March 13,
2004).
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court rejected this claim, holding simply that “there are no First
31
Amendment rights to use the copyrighted works of others.” In a
subsequent appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals similarly disposed of the plaintiffs’ free speech claim,
declaring Harper & Row to be an “insuperable bar[] to plaintiffs’
32
First Amendment theory” and holding that “copyrights are
33
categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment.” After
encountering defeats at both the trial and appellate levels, the
plaintiffs petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted
34
certiorari to hear the case.
The Supreme Court, however, gave the petitioners no quarter.
Downplaying the petitioners’ First Amendment challenge to the
35
CTEA, the Court held that it would not impose “uncommonly
strict scrutiny on a copyright scheme that incorporates its own
36
speech-protective purposes and safeguards.” By way of support,
the Court simply reasserted the definitional balance doctrine upon
which it had previously relied in Harper & Row. First, the Court
37
explained, copyright law protects only expression, and not ideas.
Therefore, it does not place any strain on the First Amendment’s
overarching purpose, which is to ensure the free dissemination of
38
ideas.
Moreover, the Court reemphasized, copyright law is
“intended . . . to be the engine of free expression,” in that it
provides an incentive for people to create more original works,
39
which in turn fosters the spread of ideas. Second, the fair use
doctrine permits the copying of another’s expression in certain

31. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3.
32. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d. 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
33. Id. (emphasis added). The D.C. Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985), as
well as its own decision in United Video, Inc. v. F.C.C., 890 F.2d 1173 (1989). Id.
34. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002) (order granting writ of
certiorari).
35. By this time, the plaintiffs had significantly honed their First Amendment
argument, alleging more specifically that the CTEA is a content-neutral regulation
of speech that does not satisfy intermediate scrutiny review because it re-allocates
the right to use certain speech from a waiting public back to a privileged few
without any relation to copyright’s incentive to create. See Brief for Petitioners at
39, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002) (No. 01-618).
36. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
37. Id. A thorough discussion of the idea/expression dichotomy appears
infra Part III.
38. Id.
39. Id. (“Indeed, copyright’s purpose is to promote the creation and
publication of free expression.”).
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circumstances, such as education, criticism, and even parody.
Hence, as Justice Ginsberg put it, the Copyright Act “contains built41
in First Amendment accommodations.”
Although the Supreme Court’s holding in Eldred seems to have
solidified its adoption of the definitional balance approach to
copyright and First Amendment tensions, the Court did overrule
the D.C. Circuit on one crucial issue. Apparently thinking it
imprudent to declare a blanket bar on all future First Amendment
claims against copyright, the Court held that “the D.C. Circuit
spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights ‘categorically
42
immune from challenges under the First Amendment.’ ”
The
ramifications of this holding are significant: It leaves the door ajar,
albeit only slightly, for courts to consider First Amendment values
in copyright cases where free speech principles might outweigh
content owners’ financial concerns.
Under what circumstances should courts give added
consideration to First Amendment concerns? After Eldred, it would
seem that the vast majority of First Amendment challenges to
copyright will be rebuffed by courts under the definitional balance
doctrine. The territory covered by the Eldred decision, however,
should extend only to the points at which the definitional balance
begins to break down and First Amendment interests remain vital.
Therefore, it is crucial to analyze the true complexities involved in
balancing free speech concerns with the creative incentive function
of the copyright system in order to identify the ways in which the
definitional balance falls short of providing an adequate
accommodation for First Amendment liberties. The purpose of
this article is to provide such an analysis in order to reveal the
narrow circumstances under which courts, in light of Eldred, might
yet allow First Amendment values to overcome the economic
43
interests of copyright holders.
40. Id. at 220.
41. Id. at 219.
42. Id. at 221 (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
43. This article will focus mainly on bolstering the consideration of First
Amendment values in the arena of copyright infringement cases. Although the
Eldred decision involved a First Amendment attack on a congressionally enacted
copyright law, its holding applies equally to the use of the First Amendment as a
defense to copyright infringement. In the Court’s own words:
We are not persuaded by petitioners’ attempt to distinguish Harper &
Row on the ground that it involved an infringement suit rather than a
declaratory action of the kind here presented. As respondent observes,
the same legal question can arise in either posture. In both postures, it is
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Part II of this article explains the foundations of both
copyright law and the First Amendment, and provides a brief
discussion of the increasing tensions between copyright interests
44
and First Amendment liberties in modern society. Part III first
expounds the legal and conceptual framework underlying the
idea/expression dichotomy in copyright and then offers arguments
to show where it fails to account for overarching First Amendment
45
concerns. Part IV begins by delving into an explication of the fair
use defense, followed by a discussion elucidating reasons why the
defense currently lacks the teeth necessary to protect certain
46
legitimate free speech rights from being subsumed by copyright.
Part V concludes that the objectives of both the First Amendment
and copyright would be better served by allowing greater flexibility
with regard to invoking the First Amendment where the
definitional balance falls short in accommodating important First
47
Amendment values.
II. A “DEFINITIONAL BALANCE”
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
48
freedom of speech, or of the press.”
With certain narrow
exceptions, the First Amendment ensures that the content of an
individual’s speech will not lead to criminal prosecution or civil
49
liability. That is, the ideas one expresses, as well as the manner in
appropriate to construe copyright’s internal safeguards to accommodate First
Amendment concerns.
Id. at 221 n.24 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore, the
Court’s holding that copyrights are not “categorically immune” from First
Amendment challenges applies in copyright infringement cases as well as
declaratory judgments.
44. See infra Part II.
45. See infra Part III.
46. See infra Part IV.
47. See infra Part V.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
49. First Amendment protection from content-based government regulation
generally does not extend to the sale of obscenity, “fighting words,” libel and
defamation, deceitful advertising, or speech inciting imminent lawless or violent
behavior. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (maintaining that
obscene speech falls outside of First Amendment protection); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding, somewhat opaquely, that speech can be
prohibited if a person of common intelligence would deem such words likely to
cause an average person to fight); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (holding that states may prohibit
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which those ideas are expressed, are subject to a broad scope of
protection from government interference. The First Amendment
shields many controversial forms of speech, including sexually
50
51
“indecent” speech, hate speech, criticism of public figures and
52
53
officials, public use of “offensive” words, and even symbolic
54
speech, such as the burning of the U.S. flag.
Although First
55
Amendment freedoms have never been held absolute, those who
choose to advance minority viewpoints and engage in controversial
modes of expression are usually spared from governmentally
56
imposed censorship.
There is no better evidence of the high premium that our
jurisprudence places on freedom of expression than the regime of
heightened scrutiny our judiciary applies to government
regulations of speech. Any state regulation of speech based on
content or viewpoint is subject to strict scrutiny review, requiring

commercial speech that is either misleading or concerns illegal activity); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that public figures and
officials may recover for defamatory falsehood if they can prove actual malice on
the part of the speaker); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that
advocacy of illegal behavior cannot be prohibited except where it is directed
toward inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action).
50. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (holding
Communications Decency Act of 1996 unconstitutional because it impinges on the
First Amendment rights of adults to access explicit speech on the Internet).
51. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-96 (1992) (holding City of
St. Paul’s hate crime ordinance unconstitutional under the First Amendment
because it unjustifiably regulates speech based on content and viewpoint).
52. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (holding
that First Amendment values require public figures and officials to carry the
burden of proving actual malice on the part of the speaker in defamation suits).
See also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (holding that public
figures and officials cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress
without a showing of New York Times malice).
53. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that the First
Amendment prevented plaintiff Cohen from being prosecuted for publicly
donning a jacket emblazoned with the words “Fuck the Draft”).
54. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989) (holding Texas’ anti-flag
burning statute unconstitutional under the First Amendment). See also United
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-19 (1990) (holding Federal Flag Protection
Act of 1989 likewise unconstitutional).
55. See supra notes 49-53.
56. However, community censorship of controversial speech is often achieved
in ways other than outright government regulation through legislative action. See
generally MARJORIE HEINS, SEX, SIN, AND BLASPHEMY: A GUIDE TO AMERICA’S
CENSORSHIP WARS (1993) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the myriad
ways in which unpopular speech can be suppressed).
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that the regulation in question be narrowly tailored to achieve a
57
compelling government interest. In order to satisfy the narrow
tailoring requirement, the government’s regulation must provide
58
the least restrictive means of achieving the government’s interest.
Strict scrutiny imposes a strong presumption of the government
59
regulation’s invalidity and almost invariably dooms the regulation.
60
Content-neutral regulations of speech are subject to a somewhat
lower yet still rigid standard of review, called intermediate
61
scrutiny. To be deemed content-neutral, a government regulation
must be “unrelated to the suppression of free expression” and only
62
Intermediate scrutiny
have an “incidental effect” on speech.
requires that the government regulation be narrowly tailored to
63
serve a substantial government interest. Narrow tailoring for the
purposes of intermediate scrutiny requires that the regulation does
not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further
64
the government’s legitimate interests.”
In addition to being
subject to one or another form of heightened scrutiny, government

57. Sable Communications of Cal. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Content-neutral regulations of speech usually involve some kind of
restriction on the time, place, or manner in which the speech may be made. The
government’s regulation must also leave open adequate alternative channels for
communication. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)
(holding that city may impose volume limit on outdoor public rock concert); City
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 63 (1986) (upholding zoning
ordinance prohibiting adult theaters from being within 1000 feet of any
residential zone, park, school, or church because it is purportedly aimed at
combating “secondary effects” such as crime and the reduction in value of
surrounding property).
61. Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 442 (2d Cir. 2001).
62. Id. at 450.
63. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994). Intermediate
scrutiny does not always entail the same standard of review in each case. The level
of scrutiny can range from just short of strict to something a notch above a
rational basis test. Depending on the nature of the constitutional right involved,
courts have used terms such as substantial, important, and significant in setting the
level of government interest and the degree to which the regulation in question is
tailored to achieving that interest. For example, under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, state-imposed classifications based on
gender must be substantially related to an important government purpose, and
the government has the burden of showing an “exceedingly persuasive
justification” for such classifications. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,
531 (1996).
64. Corley, 273 F.3d at 450 (citing Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 662 (quoting
Ward, 491 U.S. at 799)).
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regulations of speech also can be struck down for being overbroad
66
or too vague.
Copyright law, on the other hand, has its own constitutional
underpinnings.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S.
Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times
67
to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings.”
The
function of copyright is to provide an economic incentive for
individuals to create original works, with the ultimate goal of
68
benefiting the public.
The Supreme Court’s view is that “the
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free
expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create
69
and disseminate ideas.” As a means of giving practical effect to
this incentive, the Copyright Act allows authors to legally prevent
others from copying “original works of authorship fixed in any
70
tangible medium of expression.” These include literary, musical,
dramatic, choreographic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural, audiovisual,
71
and architectural works, as well as sound recordings. It grants
copyright holders the exclusive rights to the reproduction,
adaptation, distribution, public performance, and public display of
72
copyrighted works. Furthermore, because of the CTEA, the term
of copyright in works created by individual persons now lasts the
73
life of the author plus an additional seventy years.
Copyright
holders have the right to sue others for using the expression
contained in their original works.
Liability can result in
74
75
injunctions, orders to pay damages, and, in some instances,
65. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002) (holding
the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 unconstitutional under the First
Amendment because it prohibits more protected speech than necessary to achieve
its ends).
66. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (finding
provisions of the Communications Decency Act impermissibly vague).
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
68. See supra note 14.
69. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
70. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
71. Id. § 102(a)(1-8).
72. Id. § 106.
73. Id. § 302. In the case of anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and
works made for hire, “copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its
first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever
expires first.” Id. § 302(c).
74. Id. § 502.
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76

orders to pay attorneys’ fees. Moreover, violators may be subject
to federal criminal sanctions, which can involve steep fines, prison
77
terms, or both.
It is clear that the Copyright Act is a federal statutory scheme
that regulates speech. It imposes criminal and civil penalties on
authors who use the copyrightable expression of others in violation
78
of the Act.
Although authors rely on the copyright system to
make a living from their work, the copyright system can also be
used against them. Big-business interests such as Hollywood, the
recording industry, and software developers have wielded their
79
financial power in Congress and in courts to provide themselves
with a strong upper hand in the evolution of our federal copyright
80
law. The result is that a large swath of today’s popular culture is
subject to some claim of copyright ownership. The mass media,
75. Id. § 504.
76. Id. § 505.
77. Id. § 506.
78. For example, Jeff Koons, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 156
and 169-72, is a postmodern artist who has been successfully sued in copyright
infringement actions for his Warhol-esque appropriation of copyrighted pop
culture figures. In each case, his work was forfeited, and he was ordered to pay
hefty damages.
79. Big-business content owners are heavily involved in lobbying Congress,
where advancing technologies have prompted calls for tougher legislation. Jack
Valenti, the well-known and highly influential spokesperson for the Motion
Picture Association of America, has been a rabid lobbyist on Capitol Hill for
tighter statutory protection for copyrights in film. See, e.g., Copyrights: Government,
Industry Leaders Hail Copyrights as “Jewel” in U.S. Trade Crown, BNA PATENT,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW DAILY NEWS, Dec. 17, 1999, Westlaw, BNA-PTD,
12/17/1999 PTD d2 (quoting Valenti’s claim that intellectual property protection
has to be the “highest priority of Congress”). The Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, which many say goes too far in protecting digital copyright management
systems, is a result of lobbying efforts by Valenti and others. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§
1201-1205 (West 2002).
80. Examples of recent power grabs achieved by big-business content owners
are: A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’g in part
and rev’g in part, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that Napster online
file-sharing service contributorily infringed copyrights in sound recordings);
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corely, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding an
injunction under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act barring the defendant
from posting the code of a DVD decryption program called “DeCSS” on his web
site); Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 681 (D.D.C. 2003) (enforcing subpoena granted under Digital Millennium
Copyright Act requiring Internet service provider, Verizon, to disclose identities of
individuals using its service for suspected illegal online music file trading). For a
discussion of peer-to-peer technology and the ramifications of the Napster decision,
see Niels Schaumann, Copyright Infringement and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1001 (2002).
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mostly owned by large corporate interests, dominate our culture
through sounds, images, and expressions that are plastered
throughout television, radio, newspapers, magazines, billboards,
and the Internet. Because so many of these elements of culture are
increasingly subject to copyright protection, authors—especially
those who wish to make artistic or political statements about
society—are left with fewer and fewer raw materials with which to
81
work. These limitations can create serious fundamental problems
for freedom of speech.
Copyright infringement litigation, therefore, has become a
powerful weapon for stifling the speech of business competitors,
82
critics, and artists whose works comment on popular culture. This
threat of expensive and time-consuming litigation, not to mention
the consequences of losing such a lawsuit, can have a profound
chilling effect on expression—especially for the all-too-common
“starving artist” with limited financial resources.
The ramifications of such expansionist trends in the
protection of intellectual property strongly point toward a need to
scrutinize more closely what the Supreme Court calls the
“definitional balance” between First Amendment rights and the
83
goals of the copyright protection. Any attempt to find the proper
equilibrium between protecting an author’s right to freedom of
expression on the one hand and ensuring an author’s ability to
make a living from her work on the other requires examining
whether the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine

81. See Schaumann, An Artist’s Privilege, supra note 21, at 249. Professor
Schaumann discusses the ownership of popular culture by corporate mass media
outlets and the negative impact this has had on certain post-modern artists, most
notably Jeff Koons. Id. at 251. Schaumann goes on to propose that an “Artist’s
Privilege” exception should be made available to accommodate creators of fine art
whose genre entails the appropriation of various copyrighted images. Id. at 256.
82. For a discussion of the Koons cases see infra notes 156 and 169-72 and
accompanying text. In regard to business competitors in particular, the software
industry has been a copyright litigation battleground. See, e.g., Computer Assocs.
Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Mfrs. Techs., Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706
F.Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797
F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986); Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203
F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000). In cases such as these, courts have struggled with issues
concerning the protectable elements of programming code. In another area of
concern, The Church of Scientology has successfully used copyright law to shield
church doctrine from outside criticism. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online
Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
83. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)).
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together adequately accommodate the totality of First Amendment
rights.
III. THE IDEA/EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY
A. Copyright Protection Does Not Extend to Ideas
An integral component of the “definitional balance” lies in
what is called the idea/expression dichotomy. This dichotomy is
based on the fact that copyright protection does not extend to
ideas. A person may create a work that uses someone else’s ideas,
as long as the expression used to advance those ideas is not taken.
The Supreme Court case commonly cited for this well-settled
84
principle is Baker v. Selden. In this decision, the Court held that
Selden’s description of his system of accounting in a book did not
85
render the system in question subject to copyright protection.
The fact that Selden explained his accounting methods in a
published literary work, accompanied by illustrations, did not alter
86
the fact that his methods were ideas.
If Baker had copied
verbatim, or even closely paraphrased, Selden’s explanation of his
accounting system, i.e., Selden’s expression, then Baker would have
87
been liable for copyright infringement. However, Baker used only
the methods described in Selden’s book—not the expression
88
Selden used in order to describe those methods. As the Court
properly concluded, Baker had every legal right to make use of
89
Selden’s ideas.
Congress incorporated this all-important principle into section
90
102 of the 1976 Copyright Act.
Section 102(a) states that
“[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” and section 102(b)
makes it clear that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
84. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). However, the Court described this distinction in
terms of “use” versus “explanation,” as opposed to “idea” versus “expression.” Id. at
105.
85. Id. at 107.
86. Id. at 103.
87. Id. at 104.
88. Id. at 101.
89. Id. at 107.
90. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
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91

illustrated, or embodied in such work.”
Ideas are the province of the patent system, which has its own
set of rules and standards for determining whether something—
such as a particular functional design, method of operation, or
92
process—is worthy of protection.
Copyright law, on the other
hand, protects only the particular expression that an author uses to
93
convey an idea. For example, the order and choice of words in
this essay are subject to copyright protection, but the legal
arguments and factual statements advanced herein are not. The
arguments and facts are ideas, and anyone may use them without
94
engaging in copyright infringement. To use another example,
the particular selection and arrangement of shapes, colors, and
other images in a painting are protected because these things
95
represent the painter’s own individual expression.
Whatever
“message” or “meaning” may be contained in the painting,
96
however, is an unprotectable idea. These examples illustrate how
the idea/expression dichotomy is viewed as a crucial component of
the definitional balance between copyright law and the First
Amendment.
Clearly, an important purpose of the First Amendment is to
further the spread of ideas and information. This is sometimes
97
referred to as the “enlightenment function.” If ideas were subject
91. Id. § 102(b).
92. See generally Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-105 (2003) (explaining
conditions of patentability for “any new and useful process, machine,” etc.).
93. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
94. Here it is appropriate to differentiate between copyright infringement
and plagiarism. Plagiarism is essentially the intentional taking of another’s
expression and/or ideas without giving due credit to the actual source and
subsequently holding such ideas out as one’s own. Thus, copyright and plagiarism
are fundamentally different in two respects: (1) it is possible to plagiarize
another’s work without using the original author’s particular expression and (2)
copyright infringement does not require that the unauthorized taking of the
original author’s expression be done intentionally. In that sense, copyright
infringement is based in strict liability. However, willful copyright infringement
and plagiarism go hand in hand, and can subject the infringer to harsher civil
penalties. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2000) (allowing increased damages for willful
infringement). The basic difference is that plagiarism is merely unethical (it
could subject one to academic discipline as a student or tarnish one’s reputation
as a professional), while copyright infringement is illegal.
95. See, e.g., Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat’l Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62
(3d Cir. 1978).
96. See id. at 65 (“Since copyrights do not protect thematic concepts, the fact
that the same subject matter may be present in two paintings does not prove
copying or infringement.”).
97. See SMOLLA, supra note 21, § 12.05[2].

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss3/5

16

Denneson: The Definitional Imbalance between Copyright and the First Amendm
DENNESON-FINAL.DOC

2004]

COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

3/30/2004 10:14 PM

911

to copyright protection, the “marketplace of ideas” would likely
98
become barren. Authors would be unable to publish works that
build upon the ideas of others. They would either have to obtain
some kind of licensing agreement or risk being sued, both of which
would seriously squelch the advancement of knowledge and
understanding.
To their credit, the federal courts have been fairly vigilant in
ensuring that ideas remain freely usable and have gone beyond the
principles espoused in Baker v. Selden in order to spare them from
copyright protection. One example is the “merger doctrine,”
which provides that if there is only a very limited number of ways to
express an idea, then the idea and expression are said to have
99
“merged.” The merger doctrine is a judicially created principle
designed to prevent people from securing copyright ownership in
100
an idea.
It is not generally treated as an affirmative defense like
fair use, but rather it is used as an argument for denying that the
expression the defendant took from the plaintiff was copyrightable
101
subject matter.
Another example lies in the Supreme Court’s
102
decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,
which provides that a work must “possess more than a de minimis
quantum of creativity” in order to satisfy the originality
103
requirement for copyrightable subject matter.
Hence, not only
are facts and ideas uncopyrightable, but any selection,
arrangement, and coordination of facts or ideas that is “so
mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever” is
104
likewise precluded from copyright protection.
The Supreme
Court has indeed gone to some length to create a strong buffer
zone of uncopyrightability around ideas and facts. Nevertheless,
deeper analysis reveals that the idea/expression dichotomy does
not make as well-positioned a fulcrum for definitional balancing as
98. The “marketplace of ideas” concept originated in Justice Holmes’ dissent
in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919), in which he wrote of the
importance of “free trade in ideas” and “the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market.”
99. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir.
1967).
100. See id.
101. However, some courts, for reasons of practicality, treat the merger
doctrine as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 1989 WL
67434 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 1989).
102. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
103. Id. at 363.
104. Id. at 362.
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one might suppose.
B. Difficulties Inherent in the Idea/Expression Dichotomy
A major problem with the idea/expression dichotomy is that
ideas are not always easily distinguishable from the expression used
to convey them. For this reason, the use of the term “dichotomy”
to describe the relationship between idea and expression is
105
essentially a misnomer.
Many ideas are impossible to convey
without copying the particular expression used to convey them.
For example, a photograph of the My Lai massacre, as Melville
Nimmer and Rodney Smolla point out, is a work that contains an
idea that cannot realistically be conveyed without copying the
photograph itself and consequently copying the photographer’s
106
expression. The dissemination of the photograph, unchecked by
copyright law, serves the First Amendment’s “enlightenment
function” in a way that a verbal or written description cannot:
In the case of My Lai, a denial that in fact any deaths had
occurred would have been devastatingly refuted by the
photographs in a way that the verbal reports of the deaths
simply could not do. Anyone who would have to pass on
their “ideas,” i.e., the fact that dead bodies were seen
sprawled on the ground, would be at least as suspect as
those who originally reported the occurrence of the
deaths. The photographs themselves—the “expression of
107
the idea,”—made all the difference.
Here, Nimmer and Smolla illuminate how written reports of
an incident such as this—one so unbelievably terrible—simply fail
to get the message across like a photograph can.
Another example is the famous Zapruder film of the Kennedy
assassination. In Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, the defendant
published a book describing his theories regarding the Kennedy
108
The book contained sketches copied from the key
assassination.
frames of Zapruder’s film, which Life magazine had previously
109
purchased the exclusive rights to use.
Life sued for copyright

105. A “dichotomy” is defined as the “division of a class into two opposed
subclasses, as real and unreal.” WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY
505 (2d ed. 1983).
106. SMOLLA, supra note 21, § 12.05[2][c][ii].
107. Id.
108. 293 F. Supp. 130, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
109. Id. at 132.
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infringement, and the defendant raised both the First Amendment
110
and fair use as defenses. The court, per Judge Wyatt, avoided the
First Amendment issue and held that the defendant’s copying was a
fair use because the “public interest in having the fullest
information available on the murder of President Kennedy”
111
outweighed the copyright interest held by Life magazine.
Although the court characterized the defendant’s rights in terms of
fair use and not freedom of speech, the case represents a rare
application of the fair use doctrine and constitutes judicial
recognition of the fact that the images from the film convey ideas
112
that cannot be extracted from the means used to express them.
This raises a serious question concerning the Supreme Court’s
reliance on the idea/expression dichotomy. In Harper & Row, the
Court articulated and justified the idea/expression dichotomy in
the context of a literary work, reasoning that copying is not
necessary when authors can put the expression of others in their
113
own words.
However, it is much easier to formulate alternative
words and phrases to express another’s written idea than it is to
find different ways to convey an idea expressed in a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work. For example, to convey the idea of the
sheer horror of the Holocaust, an article could be written by an
eyewitness at Auschwitz describing the conditions of the camp. In
turn, someone else who had never been to Auschwitz could use the
facts and ideas from that article in writing a book about the
Holocaust, as long as that author did not use the original
eyewitness’s expression. Leaving aside for now the varying degrees
of impact certain words might have on the reader, the same general
idea would come across in both the original article and the book.
But if photographs capturing images of the conditions at Auschwitz
were taken by an eyewitness, the ideas conveyed by the
110. Id.
111. Id. at 146.
112. Judge Wyatt’s decision has been the subject of ongoing controversy.
Critics, including Melville Nimmer, have criticized Wyatt’s application of fair use
in lieu of a First Amendment defense for a variety reasons, one being his express
failure to consider Life magazine’s potential market for derivative works, and
another being that the overall “public interest” is not technically a factor in
determining fair use. Arguably, the implication is that Judge Wyatt held in favor
of the defendants under the First Amendment sub silentio, but clothed his
arguments in fair use terms. For a discussion of the fair use and First Amendment
implications of the Zapruder film case, see Fraser, supra note 21, at 21-31.
113. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556
(1985).
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photographs would likely provide a much deeper and more
convincing sense of the inhumanity and cruelty that transpired
there.
The ideas conveyed by such photographs, which are
qualitatively different than a written account, simply could not be
relayed to others without displaying or distributing copies of the
photographs themselves. As Nimmer and Smolla further elaborate:
[The] definitional balance breaks down in those special
instances where the expression for a given idea may not
be independently supplied by an idea copier. One who
wished to convey fully the “idea” of the My Lai massacre
photographs could do so only by copying the expression
as well as the idea of the photographs. To attempt a
simulated photograph with models posing as dead bodies
in order to express the idea of the original My Lai
photographs would be ludicrous. The expression must be
copied along with the idea not because it is onerous for an
idea copier to create his own expression, but rather
because the idea cannot be conveyed unless the
114
expression is also copied.
What we should take from Nimmer and Smolla’s My Lai
illustration is the understanding that explaining the distinction
between idea and expression is a much tidier job when done in the
context of literary works. The written word lends itself more easily
to alternative ways of conveying a particular idea. However, once
we attempt to separate idea and expression in the contexts of other
media, whatever clarity the distinction might have had all but
disappears.
Nimmer specifically suggests that there should be a “news
photograph” First Amendment exception for use of copyrighted
images in order to protect the public interest in obtaining
information, and that such an exception would shore up any
remaining imbalance between the First Amendment and
115
copyright.
Nimmer’s suggestion, although laudable in its own
right, is shortsighted. Nimmer’s proposed solution does not go far
enough to accommodate the overall universe of free speech
concerns, and is symptomatic of a rather vexing tendency among
scholars and the courts to conflate the objectives served by the
Speech Clause and the Press Clause whenever copyrights are at
114.
115.

SMOLLA, supra note 21, § 12.05[2][d] (citation omitted).
Id. § 1205[3].
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116

stake. This confusion is partly to blame for the fact that so much
emphasis is placed on the so-called “enlightenment function” of
the First Amendment, upon which the viability of the
idea/expression dichotomy seems to rest.
Although some overlap certainly exists, the Speech and Press
clauses of the First Amendment serve two otherwise distinct
117
functions.
The purpose of the Press Clause is to ensure
118
journalistic freedom from government interference. A free press
will serve as a “watchdog” by keeping the public informed as to the
119
actions of their government and the events in their community.
The Framers strongly regarded an informed electorate to be an
indispensable element of a successfully functioning democratic
120
society.
In their eyes, a guaranteed free press under the First
Amendment would ensure the unbridled gathering and
121
dissemination of ideas, knowledge, and information.
The Speech Clause, on the other hand, is designed with the
122
As
personal, expressive freedom of an individual in mind.
Professor C. Edwin Baker explains:
[T]he First Amendment should distinguish the Speech
and Press Clauses. Freedom of speech protects a broad
realm of individual expressive liberty. Speech freedom is
an embodiment of one of the most fundamental human
values, the right of an individual to make her own choices

116. See C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV.
891, 897 (2002).
117. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). “It was not by accident or
coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a
single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition
for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable.” Id.
(emphasis added).
118. See Baker, supra note 116, at 919.
119. Id. at 951 n.140 (citing C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY
125-213 (2002)). See also David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30
UCLA L. Rev. 455, 491-92 (1983).
120. Leslie Yalof Garfield, Note, Curtailment of Early Election Predictions: Can We
Predict the Outcome?, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 489, 520 (1984). Garfield notes that the
theory of “first amendment protection of free speech [as being] essential to an
intelligent self-government in a democratic society was strongly advocated by
Alexander Meiklejohn.” Id. at 495 n.28 Garfield goes on to note that “Meiklejohn
asserted that the objective of the framers was to help American citizens
understand their own political institutions.” Id. (citing A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT (1948)).
121. See Thomas, 323 U.S. at 530 (noting that rights to freedom in speech and
press were coupled with the right to assemble).
122. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
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about the values she expresses. This notion of speech
freedom emphasizes the normative requirement that the
state respect a person’s autonomy and not make
paternalistic decisions about what she can express. This is
the free speech right that Justice Brennan has described
as “inviolate;” the free speech right that an earlier Court
explained protected the child who refuses to salute the
flag. That is, the Constitution requires respect for
individual autonomy and mandates protection of
123
individual speech choices.
The dissemination of ideas and facts, i.e., the “enlightenment
function” to which Nimmer and the Supreme Court often allude, is
more closely aligned with the objectives of the Press Clause than
with the Speech Clause. As Professor Baker correctly argues, the
First Amendment places “protection of individual liberty at the
heart of the Speech Clause and protection of democratic
124
communications structures at the heart of the Press Clause.”
Therefore, even if the Supreme Court were to adopt Nimmer’s
“news photograph” exception or even Judge Wyatt’s fair use stance
125
on Life’s monopoly over the Zapruder films, it would only serve to
alleviate a First Amendment shortcoming of the copyright system
with respect to the Press Clause.
Put simply, the First Amendment does not protect ideas alone.
It also protects the way in which an individual chooses to express
those ideas. The Supreme Court has struck down numerous state
and federal attempts to suppress controversial and unpopular
forms of expression, notwithstanding the fact that there may be less
incendiary, disruptive, intrusive, or offensive ways of conveying the
particular idea expressed—even certain forms of conduct that
126
qualify as “symbolic speech,” such as burning the American flag.
127
As the Court so eloquently stated in Cohen v. California, “we
cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular
words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in
128
the process.”
Nevertheless, this crucial First Amendment
123. Baker, supra note 116, at 897-98 (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 951.
125. See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 54.
127. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Another fact that many in copyright and First
Amendment circles find interesting about this case is that it was none other than
Melville Nimmer himself who represented and ultimately exonerated Mr. Cohen.
128. Id. at 26. Justice Brennan made a similarly lucid observation in his
famous dissent in F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (ruling that the
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principle becomes lost on the Court whenever freedom of speech is
invoked as a defense to a claim of copyright infringement.
It has been shown that there is a certain precariousness
involved in trying to surgically extract pure ideas from the
expression in which those ideas are embedded.
The
idea/expression dichotomy, therefore, does not provide a
sufficiently careful balancing of First Amendment liberties with the
objectives of copyright protection. Even so, the textbook response
to any set of arguments exposing the free speech protective
inadequacy of the idea/expression dichotomy involves an appeal to
the fair use doctrine. As will be shown, however, the fair use
defense, as it is currently applied, makes for a woefully inadequate
free speech “accommodation.”
IV. THE FAIR USE DEFENSE
A. Fair Use Explained
Long before the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, courts
had developed a common law safety valve for defendants accused
129
A defendant was entitled to argue
of copyright infringement.
130
that the copying of the plaintiff’s work was a fair use.
Justice
Story’s oft-quoted formulation of the doctrine asked courts to “look
to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and
value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects,
of the original work” in determining whether the defendant’s use

Federal Communications Commission may prohibit indecent speech on the radio
during daytime hours when children are likely to be inadvertently exposed):
The idea that the content of a message and its potential impact on any
who might receive it can be divorced from the words that are the
vehicle for its expression is transparently fallacious. A given work may
have a unique capacity to capsule an idea, evoke an emotion, or
conjure up an image. Indeed, for those of us who place an
appropriately high value on our cherished First Amendment rights, the
word “censor” is such a word.
Id. at 773 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
129. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342, 346-47 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)
(holding that letters written by George Washington were exclusively copyrighted
and defendants were enjoined from further publishing the letters in their book).
The 1976 Copyright Act’s predecessor, the 1909 Copyright Act, contained no
provision for fair use. See generally 1909 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat.
1075 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000)).
130. Folsom, 9 F.Cas. at 348.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

23

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 5
DENNESON-FINAL.DOC

918

3/30/2004 10:14 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:3

of the plaintiff’s expression was fair and thus prevented the plaintiff
131
from recovering.
While drafting the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress wrote fair use
into section 107, which provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A,
the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright.
In
determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered
shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon
132
consideration of all the above factors.
133
Fair use has been held to be an affirmative defense, which
requires a court to first find that the defendant’s use infringes the
plaintiff’s work. Only after the infringement issue is fully litigated
or the defendant concedes infringement can the fair use issue be
134
examined. A fair use analysis requires a court to apply the factors
listed in section 107 on a case-by-case basis, according to the nature
135
Some factors will be more applicable
of the defendant’s use.

131. Id.
132. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
133. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561
(1985).
134. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994) (“It is
uncontested here that 2 Live Crew’s song would be an infringement of AcuffRose’s rights in ‘Oh, Pretty Woman,’ under the Copyright Act of 1976, but for a
finding of fair use through parody.”) (internal citations omitted).
135. Id. at 577 (citing to Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560).
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136

than others depending on the facts of each particular case.
In
addition, the list of factors in section 107 is nonexclusive, which
gives courts some latitude in arriving at a finding of fair use based
137
on other considerations.
In practice, the first and fourth factors, namely “the purpose
and character of the use” and “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” are usually
138
139
given the most weight. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the
Supreme Court held “transformative” uses to be strong candidates
140
for fair use protection.
A transformative use “adds something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with [a] new expression, meaning, or message,” as opposed to a
141
work that merely “supplants” the original in the marketplace.
A
parody of another’s work, for instance, is now a well-recognized
transformative use because “it can provide social benefit, by
shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a
142
new one.” The fourth factor is also given greater weight because
if there is little or no impact on the plaintiff’s current or potential
market, then no damage is done to the financial incentive function
143
of the copyright monopoly.
The first and fourth factors usually
go hand-in-hand because the more transformative a use is, the less
likely it will substitute for the original in the marketplace, and the
144
less relevant the second and third factors are to the analysis.
The fair use defense is viewed as a prophylactic against the
draconian enforcement of the exclusive rights provided to
145
copyright holders under sections 106 and 106A.
It absolves
defendants of liability for infringement by permitting certain uses
136. See id. at 577-78 (emphasizing the “illustrative” nature of the text and that
the factors must be analyzed “in light of the purposes of copyright”).
137. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560-61.
138. See id. at 566 (describing the last factor, the effect on the market, as being
“undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use”). See also Campbell,
510 U.S. at 578-86 (analyzing the first factor of section 107 and placing
considerable emphasis on whether the work is transformative).
139. 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (ruling 2 Live Crew’s rap parody of Roy Orbison’s
“Pretty Woman” to be fair use).
140. Id. at 579 (“[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding
of fair use.”).
141. Id. (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 462).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 590-94 (analyzing the fourth factor of section 107).
144. Id. at 581 (contrasting parodies based on the risk of market substitution).
145. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 106A (2000).
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that are consistent with the ultimate end of the copyright system,
146
Fair use requires courts “to avoid
which is to benefit the public.
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it
would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to
147
foster.”
In other words, it attempts to prevent copyright from
becoming self-defeating. Although the Supreme Court has never
148
expressly ruled fair use a constitutional requirement, it has long
recognized that certain latitude must be allowed for scholarship,
comment, and criticism in order to prevent the copyright system
149
from stunting the advancement of human thought.
The Court
also maintains that because the fair use exception carves out a
significant swath of permissible copying for these purposes, First
150
Amendment freedoms are adequately accommodated as well.
B. The Shortcomings of the Fair Use Defense
Reliance upon the fair use doctrine, as it is currently applied,
to shore up the imbalance between free-speech rights and
copyright interests is misguided. Probably the most compelling
reason to consider fair use an inadequate free-speech
accommodation is that it is an affirmative defense. Again, this fact
necessarily entails that anyone considering making questionable
use of copyrighted material must first be sued for infringement and
then endure a period of time-consuming and prohibitively
expensive litigation before fair use can be of any avail, if at all.
Furthermore, since fair use is not a “bright-line” rule and is decided
151
only on a case-by-case basis, the success of a fair use defense is in
many cases difficult to predict. The threat of being sued, by itself,
can have a profound chilling effect on a person’s speech. Coupled
with the difficulty of predicting a successful defense, the potentially
high price of losing looms large and renders the chilling effect on
146. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546.
147. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting Iowa State Univ.
Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 651 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
148. However, the Court has come pretty close. “From the infancy of
copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has
been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575-76 (quoting the U.S.
Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
149. Stewart, 495 U.S. at 236 (highlighting some of the categories enumerated
in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 ed.).
150. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003).
151. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
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speech all the more potent. This gives copyright holders a strong
upper hand in compelling someone with an otherwise viable fair
use claim to enter into a licensing agreement or to cease and desist
152
altogether.
Based on such realities, it is difficult to see how the
fair use exception offers any real solace for an average garage band
member or starving artist, who typically does not have the financial
wherewithal to defend a copyright infringement claim.
Another reason fair use is inadequate is that it fails to
recognize the merits of certain forms of artistic expression and
social commentary. Although the Supreme Court ruled in Campbell
that copying for the purposes of parody is a fair use, it allowed fair
use protection only for works that aim their criticism at the original
153
work from which the expression was taken.
Works of ordinary
satire, the Court held, comment on society in general, and hence
154
fall outside the boundaries of fair use.
This distinction makes
things difficult for creators of satire who make use of copyrighted
works in order to comment on social and cultural ills. Jeff Koons,
for example, is a well-known postmodern artist who found himself
on the losing side of a number of copyright infringement suits just
155
prior to the Campbell decision. Koons’s work appropriates images
from various commercial media and “recontextualizes” them in a
manner that levels criticism toward popular culture. In each of
these lawsuits, Koons’s fair use defense was unavailing because the
critical elements of his works were not held to be primarily aimed
at the originals from which they were taken, but rather at modern
152. Other commentators have explored the chilling effects of copyright
regulation on speech as well. See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001). See also Diane
Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on
Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 709 (1992); Jessica
Litman, Electronic Commerce & Free Speech, 1 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 213, 217-218
(1999), at http://www.msen.com/~litman/freespeech.pdf (last visited March 13,
2004).
153. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-81.
154. Id. at 581.
155. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (ruling Koons’s
appropriation of Art Rogers “String of Puppies” photograph was not fair use);
Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055, 1993 WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993)
(finding Koons’s appropriation of Barbara Campbell’s “Boys with Pig” photograph
not a fair use); United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F.Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (holding Koons’s appropriation of “Odie” character from “Garfield” comic
strip series not a fair use). Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari only two years before, handing down its decision regarding 2 Live Crew’s
parody in Campbell. See Koons v. Rogers, 506 U.S. 934 (1992) (order denying
certiorari).
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156

society in general.
The Supreme Court’s delineation of “true”
parody from ordinary satire thus provides no vindication for artists
like Koons and serves only to induce hesitation in anyone
considering the use of another’s work for the purposes of social or
artistic commentary.
In Campbell, the Supreme Court justified its distinction
between satire and parody on its view that “[p]arody needs to
mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use
the creation of its victim’s (or collectively victims’) imagination,
whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires
157
justification for the very act of borrowing.” This line of reasoning
is based on the fears that a satirical work, which merely criticizes
society at large, runs a greater risk of being sold or licensed out as a
market substitute or derivative work because it is more likely to fail
158
in “conjuring up” and differentiating itself from the original.
In
the Campbell Court’s view, a parody is said to conjure up the
original work by altering it in a manner that lampoons the original
directly, thereby creating a greater likelihood that consumers will
159
not confuse it with the original work.
A satire, on the other
160
hand, need not be altered in order to serve a satiric purpose.
Hence, consumers are less likely to see the connection between a
satirical work and the original, and might consequently mistake a
161
satire for the original or a licensed derivative in the marketplace.
Furthermore, a satirist, unlike a parodist, is perfectly able to poke
fun at society by creating her own original expression or by using
162
works that are in the public domain.
This argument justifying the Court’s distinction between
parody and satire is flawed, however, and it raises rather serious
First Amendment concerns. As Michael Einhorn points out, uses
156. See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310; Campbell, 1993 WL 97381 at *3; United Features
Syndicate, 871 F.Supp. at 383-84.
157. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-81.
158. See id. at 588.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 581.
161. See id.
162. William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit,
Presumption, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 714 (1993) (“If the
defendant is commenting on something that has nothing to do with the plaintiff’s
work, he has no need to use the plaintiff’s work to make that comment. He can
equally well create his own expression, or use material in the public domain.”).
Patry and Perlmutter’s article is cited approvingly in the Campbell decision. See
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
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for the purposes of social criticism fulfill First Amendment values at
least as much, if not more than, direct criticism of a particular
individual or work, and are just as likely to be refused licensing by
the original copyright holder:
From an economic perspective, a distinction in licensing
procedures regarding parody and satire can be justified
only if there is a market failure inherent in the licensing
of one but not the other. The distinction between the two
here can seem contrived. The comedic criticisms of satire
and parody would seem equally transformative and
usurping of demand for the original. Regarding the
difficulty of obtaining a license, the chances for obtaining
a purely voluntary license for disseminating either a
parody or a number of satires—particularly involving
political content or cultural criticism—may be equally
slim. As a general matter, it is also questionable to
contend that satirists denied access to one work may
always find a suitable substitute among others.
The gains to the general public from satire, if anything,
seem greater than in parody. There are profound benefits
to be had when artists and writers can make use of
recognized artifacts and icons to ridicule or criticize
political institutions, cultural values, or media
presentations. From an economic perspective, these gains
from social or political criticism are public benefits that
cannot be appropriated in two-party exchange and cannot
be readily priced. To widen opportunities for political
expression and facilitate cultural exchange, it would be
beneficial to facilitate many of these satiric uses, which
implicate critical dimensions that are no part of a directed
parody. It is difficult to understand how parodies that
directly ridicule individual works would be of greater
163
social importance.
In addition, the line between satire and parody is substantially
blurred. The Supreme Court even admits this much in Campbell,
stating that “parody often shades into satire when society is
lampooned through its creative artifacts . . . [and] a work may
164
A gray area of
contain both parodic and nonparodic elements.”
this magnitude creates an intolerable degree of legal uncertainty.
It exacerbates copyright’s chilling effect on speech by leaving
163. Michael A. Einhorn, Miss Scarlett’s License Done Gone!: Parody, Satire, and
Markets, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 589, 603 (2002).
164. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581.
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speakers—not to mention their attorneys—with little guidance as
to whether a court will consider their work a satire or a parody.
Such distinctions are hopelessly murky and wholly unnecessary.
Judges should not have to call upon their artistic insights to
categorize works into particular genres in order to make fair use
determinations.
If First Amendment values cannot overcome content owners’
financial concerns in order to protect social critics making use of
copyrighted material, the ability of artists and social commentators
to create relevant and effective satires of modern-day society will
continue to diminish. Today, as mentioned herein, the mass media
dominates our culture, and most of the products of mass media are
165
subject to copyright protection. Artists who wish to comment on
society, therefore, find themselves faced with a dwindling “aesthetic
vocabulary” of raw materials with which to work:
With advancing technology . . . it has become both
possible and profitable to saturate entire populations with
images. As a result, privately owned images have become
ubiquitous. In Sherrie Levine’s words, “ ‘[t]he world is
165. In addition to material subject to copyright protection, there are vast
quantities of names, slogans, symbols, sounds, icons, and designs that are subject
to trademark protection. Trademark infringement and dilution litigation has
been used against speakers in much the same manner as copyright infringement.
The outcomes have varied by circuit. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366, 376 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d., 604 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir. 1979) (upholding an injunction against the use of a promotional poster for
the adult film “Debbie Does Dallas,” which featured porn actress Bambi Woods
donning a cheerleading uniform that resembled those worn by the Dallas Cowboys
cheerleaders); Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 403 (8th
Cir. 1987) (finding trademark infringement where defendant sold caps and Tshirts featuring a decayed Indian head and the slogans “Mutant of Omaha” and
“Nuclear Holocaust Insurance” as a form of political protest of Mutual of Omaha’s
involvement in nuclear proliferation); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci
Publications et al., 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1112 (1995)
(holding that “Michelob Oily” parody of Anheuser-Busch logo in 1989 issue of
Snicker magazine was infringing). But see L.L. Bean Inc. v. Drake Publishers Inc.,
811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987) (holding that High
Society magazine’s erotic parody of L.L. Bean clothing catalogues, entitled “L.L.
Beam’s Back-to-School-Sex-Catolog,” was not infringing); Jordache Enters., Inc. v.
Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987) (ruling that defendant’s use of a
pig’s head logo and “Lardasche” mark on jeans did not infringe upon Jordasche’s
trademark); Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D.
Cal. 1998) (holding defendant entitled to summary judgment because his “Bally’s
Sucks” web site did not infringe Bally’s mark). For a recent, shining example of
what an entirely meritless trademark infringement and dilution case looks like, see
Fox News v. Penguin Group and Al Franken, as discussed in Fox Sues Al Franken,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003, at B1.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss3/5

30

Denneson: The Definitional Imbalance between Copyright and the First Amendm
DENNESON-FINAL.DOC

2004]

COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

3/30/2004 10:14 PM

925

filled to suffocating. Man has placed his token on every
stone. Every work, every image is leased and mortgaged.’ ”
Thus, artists are deprived of their vocabulary, their source
materials, and ultimately, the basic elements of their
166
expression.
A biting satire exposing the folly of today’s hypercommercialized culture and vapid consumerism, for example,
might not be especially poignant without at least some use of
copyrighted materials. Works in today’s public domain seem like
fairly impotent substitutes for modern, copyrighted works because
corporate copyrights now last ninety-five years from the date of
publication or 120 years from the date of creation, whichever
comes first, and individual copyrights last the life of the author plus
167
It is therefore laughable to suggest that materials
seventy years.
created at the turn of the twentieth century can provide any satiric
applicability to today’s society, or that materials copyrighted today
will carry any significant satiric worth at the turn of the twentysecond century.
Without First Amendment protection for
transformative, satiric uses of copyrighted material, artists who
attempt to hold a mirror up to society will be stuck with little more
than anachronisms and irrelevancies.
When an artist does hold a mirror up to society, reflecting
back its images and icons in a critical light, the creators and owners
of those images and icons are naturally going to be upset. In these
instances, use of the work is just as unlikely to be licensed as a use
that lampoons the copyrighted work itself directly. Excluding satire
from fair use while protecting parody simply leaves the door wide
open for copyright holders to engage in purely retaliatory, rentseeking litigation. Returning to the case of Koons, for example, it
is difficult to believe that the plaintiffs were actually concerned
about their market for derivative works when they brought their
lawsuits. More likely, they felt insulted that Koons was singling
their works out as part and parcel of the banality of popular
168
culture.
There can be little doubt that patrons of Koons’s work
166. See Schaumann, supra note 81, at 252 (internal citations omitted).
167. 17 U.S.C.A. § 302(c) (2003). Of course, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 112 Stat. 2827, has
helped tremendously in exacerbating this state of affairs.
168. In all fairness, however, this was likely coupled with the fact that his works
were selling for six figures. All the same, neither of these facts should make a
difference in the analysis when Koons’s works were not actually substituting for the
originals in the marketplace.
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shared in his disgust with the insipidity of modern popular culture
and would not have had any interest in purchasing an approved
169
sculpture either made or licensed by the plaintiffs. Likewise, fans
of the plaintiffs’ works would not find Koons’s sculptures an
acceptable substitute for or attractive derivative of the originals due
to the derogatory light in which Koons cast them. Therefore, it
should go without saying that the plaintiffs would have flatly
refused to license the use of their works to Koons, once alerted to
his plans to incorporate them in a derisive art exhibit entitled,
170
“Banality Show.”
Koons is simply one of numerous authors who
have been successfully sued because the copyright holders did not
171
want their productions depicted in an unflattering light.
The First Amendment concerns here are obvious and the
implications are grave. The purpose of the Speech Clause is to
prevent the government from tampering with an individual’s right
to make her own choices regarding how she expresses her own
unique values. Allowing content owners to invoke the Copyright
Act and the powers of the federal court system to suppress uses that
169. As Professor Niels Schaumann aptly puts it:
Suppose the plaintiff in Rogers v. Koons claimed harm to the market
that would have arisen had he decided to make his own sculptures
based on his postcard. Does anyone suppose that the art world would
have treated the plaintiff’s sculptures as equivalent to those of Koons?
Certainly not; at least one feature making Koons’s work desirable is
that it is by Koons. Even when the copying work is virtually identical to
the copied work, the art market is well equipped to distinguish
between them. In cases where the copying and copied works are not
identical, distinguishing between the works is even easier (and is even
less likely to damage copyright’s economic incentive to create). The art
world is used to being faced with two works that appear identical; it
does not treat such works as interchangeable.
Schaumann, supra note 81, at 277-78.
170. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1992).
171. Koons’s work is probably the most extreme form of copying. However,
copying which comes more within the gray area between satire and parody has
routinely been ruled an unfair use. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581
F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting fair use for comic portrayal of Disney
characters engaging in such anti-Disney activities as promiscuity and drug use),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. dismissed, 521 U.S. 1146 (1997) (upholding an
injunction of a satirical book about the O.J. Simpson trial written in Dr. Suess’s
poetic style); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981) (upholding
injunction on “Cunnilingus Champion of Company C” musical spoof on “Boogie
Woogie Bugle Boy”); Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp.
1397, 1398 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (male porn stars wearing Mickey Mouse ears in adult
film while Mickey Mouse Club theme song played in the background held to be
infringing).
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are unflattering to their works rails against this most fundamental
First Amendment liberty—especially when done under the pretext
of protecting supposed potential markets for derivative works. As
Professor Baker explains:
[C]ulturally challenging transformations . . . are precisely
what the First Amendment most clearly should protect.
(Properly interpreted, the Copyright Clause itself may not
have authorized such legislative limitations on these uses.)
The normative principle is that authors should have the
right to contribute to, not exercise power over, cultural
discourse and change . . . .
[T]he First Amendment should especially protect
dissident or norm-challenging uses of copyrighted
materials. This consideration provides the constitutionally
required reason for an expansive reading of the privilege
to engage in transformative uses. The privilege should be
read to prevent any stifling of diverse, especially dissenting
or non-mainstream, expression. These uses are also
precisely the ones for which many copyright holders, even
for a payment, are least likely to give consent. Thus, both
the rationale for and the need for a privilege to ignore the
author’s copyright claim exists here at a heightened
172
level.
Although it might not necessarily aim its ridicule directly at the
work being copied, ordinary satire can be substantially
transformative in nature.
Koons’s work, for example, is
transformative in the sense that it recasts the copyrighted works in
an entirely new light, regardless of the fact that the original images
are copied verbatim. The images are presented in a manner that
reveals them to be, in the eyes of both Koons and his admirers,
expressions of an empty and vapid popular culture.
Social commentary of Koons’s vein is easily distinguishable
from the mindless manufacture of freeloading knock-offs. For
example, if an author wished to satirize some aspect of society and
did so by copying another author’s satire that made a similar point,
a clear case of copyright infringement would be afoot. In this
situation, the two authors would share a common audience, and
thus a common market. The copying author’s work would have no
transformative value because it would shed no new, critical light on

172. C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891,
941-42 (2002).
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the original. Hence, the original author likely would be happy to
negotiate a license for such a use because the resulting imitation
would entail a form of flattery. Works of social criticism such as
Koons’s, by contrast, set their copied articles squarely within the
universe of cultural folly held up to ridicule. By placing such an
unwarranted emphasis on a blurred differentiation between parody
and satire, the Campbell Court overlooked the transformative
possibilities existing in uses for social commentary. Because the
fair use defense, as currently applied, fails to protect certain
transformative yet non-parodic uses, it is insufficient as a First
Amendment accommodation.
V. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the “definitional balance,” a principle that
courts continue to exhume every time a First Amendment
contention is raised against the backdrop of a competing copyright
interest, succeeds only in obscuring the increasingly unstable
relationship between copyright and the First Amendment. This
article has set out to debunk the proposition that the
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use provide a properly
calibrated balance between First Amendment liberties and the
goals of the Copyright Act. In doing so, this article has shown that
there are circumstances, uncontemplated under the definitional
balance, in which courts should allow First Amendment values to
overcome the economic interests of copyright holders.
An author should not be allowed to use the weight of the
copyright system as a means of retaliation or suppression. First
Amendment principles, if they mean anything, should be read to
allow authors to use copyrighted works not only for certain news
and press-related objectives as Nimmer suggests, but also for
purposes of social criticism when there is little or no actual danger
that the new work will usurp the original in the marketplace. The
touchstone for identifying such uses should lie not in
differentiating parody from satire, but in determining whether the
new work is transformative in the sense that it recasts the original in
a critical or unapproving light, one whereby the copyright holder
would likely be unwilling, at any price, to grant a license. This
would relieve judges of the need to enter the quagmire of parsing
artistic genres while at the same time providing more legal
predictability by removing judicial reliance on such hazy
distinctions.
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The best chance of facilitating such changes in the courts now
probably rests with attempts to strengthen and expand the fair use
doctrine. Prior to the Eldred case, some commentators had
suggested that copyright be subjected to heightened First
173
Amendment scrutiny in cases dealing with free speech issues.
174
The petitioners in the Eldred case, however, argued the same, and
the Court responded in no uncertain terms: “We reject Petitioner’s
plea for imposition of uncommonly strict scrutiny on a copyright
scheme that incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and
175
safeguards.”
It now appears that any judicial entertainment of
the use of heightened scrutiny is, at least for a while, out of the
question. Nevertheless, well-crafted fair use arguments stressing
First Amendment values could provide possible inroads to
increased judicial recognition of essential free speech liberties in
176
the face of copyright infringement claims.
Copyright is intended to carry out the noble purpose of
ensuring that authors are capable of making a living from the
objects of their creativity. It serves the indispensable function of
helping to encourage the production of works of art, music,
literature, film, and scholarship, all of which enrich our lives
considerably. Artists, writers, musicians, and other authors may
understandably rejoice in various expansions of their rights under
the copyright system, but they must also remain wary of the
ramifications an expanded copyright regime can hold for their
equally cherished freedom of speech. Since most authors loathe
censorship as much as infringement, they should take note of the
fact that the copyright system itself can be used as an instrument of
censorship. When copyright laws can be invoked for the purpose
of suppressing speech that offends a copyright holder, the
objectives of both copyright and the First Amendment suffer.

173. See, e.g. Netanel, supra note 152, at 86 (“Heightened scrutiny should be
applied both to discern whether Copyright Act provisions burden more speech
than essential . . . .”).
174. Brief for Petitioners at 37-39, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002).
175. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 186, 218-19 (2003).
176. Legislative intervention to strengthen fair use under section 107 of the
1976 Copyright Act or to create new forms of compulsory licensing is also an
option, but given the current trend of catering to rent-seeking content owners in
Congress, such intervention seems highly improbable.
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